Shawali Khan is a citizen of Afghanistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 899. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1963, in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

US District Court Judge John D. Bates, who has reviewed Shawali's confidential file, wrote that all the allegations he faced were based on “multiple levels of hearsay”, that “all of the information contained in the reports could come from a single individual” and that “no source is identified by name.”[2] Shahwali Khan's lawyer Leonard C. Goodman, who has reviewed Shawali's confidential file says he was simply a merchant, denounced for a bounty.

As of October 13, 2010, Shawali Khan has been held at Guantanamo for seven years eight months.Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag. Tag has more than one name associated with reference.

Combatant Status Review TribunalEdit

File:Trailer where CSR Tribunals were held.jpg

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunal to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Khan chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; refs with no name must have content.


a. Detainee is allied with al Qaida and the Taliban.
  1. Detainee's uncle was the commander of a known terrorist organization.
  2. Detainee was a member of the same terrorist organization.
  3. Detainee worked for this known terrorist organization as an operator on the communications system.
  4. The terrorist organization is led by an individual that has been found to be allied with al Qaida and the Taliban,
  5. This terrorist organization is led by an individual who was formally designated by the U.S. Government as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist."
  6. Upon capture, numerous weapons were found on the detainee's family orchard to include two tanks, rockets, Kalashnikovs, and other guns.
  7. A search of the detainee's house revealed receipts and paperwork showing a transfer of weapons, including Kalashnikov rifles, a rocket and three machine guns, from his uncle to another individual.
  8. The detainee was also found with a fifty-meter spool of detonation cord.

Witness requestEdit

Khan had requested two witnesses, who were ruled “not reasonably available”, because attempts to access those witnesses, through diplomatic channels, failed.[citation needed]

Main article: Witnesses requested by Guantanamo captives


Administrative Review Board hearingEdit

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Khan chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[3]

Enemy Combatant election formEdit

Swahali Khan's Assisting Military Officer reported from the Enemy Combatant election form prepared during a meeting with Swahali Khan on August 30, 2005, which lasted 45 minutes. His Assisting Military Officer described him as polite and cooperative.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee claimed the Taliban conscripted him in approximately 1998, took him from his land and forced him to perform duties as a guard and general laborer for approximately two months. The detainee claimed he was involved in one battle against the Northern Alliance, but stated his entire group (approximately 70 individuals) retreated and ran back to the Taliban facilities when the fighting started.
  2. The detainee worked for the Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) during the Mujahedin as an operator of the "I COMM" system, or communications system.
  3. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviet. HIG has long established ties with USama Bin Laden. HIG founder Gulbuddin Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and offered to shelter Bin Laden after the later fled Sudan in 1996. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), and establish a fundamentalist state.
  4. The detainee was identified as a go-between and facilitator within an HIG operations cell in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He owned a small oil shop in Kandahar and used the shop to conduct meetings as a contact point with other members within the cell.
  5. In early September 2002, HIG commander Zabit Jalil directed the detainee to carry out a terrroist operation targeted at U.S. Military personnel located at Gecko base, Kandahar, Afghanistan. Jalil sent a second unidentified individual who was allegedly an explosives expert from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to assist the detainee in the attacks.
  6. n 9 November 2002, the detainee delivered a radio-controlled binary detonation device and two blasting caps to an operative working within his organization. The device was to be used in conjunction with two mines. The intended use for those items was to target American civilians or U.S.-led coalition military patrols.
  7. As of early September 2002, the detainee was trying to purchase two rockets through an intermediary.
b. Training
The detainee stated he was taken to a HIG training camp in Pakistan. They were trained on the use of cannons, radios, rockets, mortars and RPGs.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee contacted other cell members solely through radio communication and acted as messenger between cell operatives and Noor Agha. Materials and direction for operations were controlled by Noor Agha with the cells kept separate from each other through communications passed by the detainee.
  2. Noor Agha was the facilitator and command element of the cell. He brought supplies and explosives from Pakistan through border crossing points in the Spin Boldak district. Agha received his orders and operational supplies from Zabit Jalil in Quetta Pakistan.
  3. The detainee's uncle is Zabit Jalil, a commander in HIG.
  4. Zabit Jalil has a direct association with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and attends meetings with him. In addition Hikmatyar, Jalil maintains contacts with extremist Arabs and Kashmiris in Pakistan as well as specialists that manufacture the radio-controlled detonation devices.
d. Other Relevant Data
Upon capture, numerous weapons were found in the detainee's family orchard to include 2 tanks, rockets, Kalashnikovs and other guns. The detainee was also found with a 50-meter spool of detonation cord.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee was asked whether he was told by his uncle to place explosives He answered decisively no.
b. The detainee claimed ignorance of his uncle's activities. The detainee stated that while his uncle was in Afghanistan the uncle worked for the Karzai government, therefore detainee also worked for the Karzai government.


External linksEdit